This paper analyzes the development of the banking sector in European transition countries. We find that, although bank assets increased during the 1990s, credit to the private sector remained relatively low. Foreign-owned banks have become major players in the financial system of these countries.
Introduction
There is a growing interest in the impact of foreign banking on the financial system and the economic development of emerging and transition countries (Claessens, Demirgűç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Iakova and Wagner 2001; Mathieson and Roldos 2001) . The upcoming eastward enlargement of the European Union has only increased this interest. During the past decade, many former communist countries have made substantial progress in the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market based economy. In recent years, progress has been particularly significant in restructuring and consolidating the banking sector. This has mainly been accomplished through the privatization of state-owned banks and the opening-up of the banking sector to foreign ownership. This paper analyzes the development of the banking sector during the transition process in the Central and Eastern European countries. We particularly focus on the position of foreign-owned banks, as it turns out that they play an important role in the development of the financial system of European transition countries: more than half of the banks in the region are foreign-owned, accounting for two thirds of total bank assets. We have gathered new data about several aspects of the development, structure, conduct and performance of the banking sector in the region. As such, this paper is one of the first to analyze the complete region on the basis of an identical methodology for all countries. Our analysis is based on a number of key indicators, summarized in Appendix 1. We use definitions in line with those proposed by Beck, Demirgűç-Kunt and Levine (1999) . We define a bank to be foreign in case 1 Up to now, most studies focused on a limited number of countries within the region. For example, Dobosiewicz (1995) , Mervart (1996) , Sabi (1996) , Buch (1997) , Steinherr (1997) , Bonin, Mizsei, Székely and Wachtel (1998) , Bonin and Abel (2000) , Galac and Kraft (2000) , Hasan and Marton (2000) , Scholtens (2000) , Storf (2000) , Barisitz (2001) , Schardax and Reiniger (2001) . For a comprehensive overview of the financial sector in transition countries in , see ECB (2002 . more than 50 percent of its shares are owned by foreigners. Of course, banks from outside the country may have a minority share so that focusing on the number of banks owned by foreign banks may underestimate foreign influence. Therefore, we also take in consideration the development of foreign-owned bank assets.
A problem in analyzing the transition process is the lack of reliable data. Therefore, we have sought the co-operation of central banks in the region. Several central banks helped us to gather aggregated data required to analyze the development of the banking sector and the role of foreign banks. This information was supplemented with data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and data from the EBRD. However, for a good understanding of the banking sector in the transition economies, adequate knowledge of the operations of individual banks is essential. Data on individual banks were therefore gathered using the BankScope database.
Our main findings are that the speed of financial development has been rather slow in the transition countries. Foreign-owned banks have become major players in the financial system of Central and EasternEuropean countries. However, financial development and foreign bank presence vary considerably among the transition economies. Although bank assets increased during the 1990s, credit to the private sector remained relatively low. Foreign-owned banks lend more to the private sector than domestic banks. They have, in general, also higher profitability levels than domestic banks. However, it also appears that the performance of foreign and domestic banks tend to converge.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The following section points out some basic features of the financial system in the transition economies. We focus on the intermediation role of the banking sector in the selected transition economies and make a comparison with the euro area.
Section 2 examines the degree of foreign bank penetration in transition economies. Trends in the number of foreign-owned banks and their assets will be discussed. This will give us an idea about the importance of their presence. Section 3 analyzes the background and key characteristics of foreign-owned banks. Section 4 compares the activities of foreign and domestic banks. Section 5 evaluates bank performance in the European transition countries, focusing on profitability and efficiency of domestic and foreign banks. Section 6 concludes.
1.
Intermediation Figure 1 shows the development of the average assets of deposit money banks as a ratio to GDP in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the euro area, while figure 2 presents figures for individual countries in the year 2000. The ratio between banks assets and GDP illustrates the importance of the financial services provided by banks relative to the size of the economy (Beck et al., 1999) . In general, the average of deposit money bank assets to GDP in the euro area is at least twice as high as in the transition countries. The European transition economies show no uniform pattern of financial development. Bank assets in relation to GDP is by far highest in the Czech
Republic (see figure 2) . This is the only European transition economy with a financial sector size similar to that of the euro area. In Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia bank assets amount to more than 60% of GDP in 2000 and this ratio has been moving upward in the recent past. Croatian banks have assets that amount to about 50% of GDP. Banking sectors are smallest in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Macedonia and Romania. In these countries, this key ratio has even been subject to a downward trend.
Figures 1 and 2 also present the level of bank claims on the private sector as share of GDP. This ratio shows the importance of one of the main functions of financial intermediaries, i.e. channeling funds to investors.
Private credit captures the loans to the private non-financial sector (Beck et al., 1999) . The difference with total deposit money bank assets mainly consists of claims on the government and on (semi-)public enterprises. Figure 1 shows that credit to the private sector increased in CEE countries but to a lesser extent than total deposit money bank assets. In the euro area, According to De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2002) , the reluctance of banks to grant new loans to the private sector partly results from lengthy legal procedures, especially the inadequate enforcement of creditor rights.
Indeed, as follows from figure 3, the average share of credit to the private sector as share of total credit in CEE countries hovers around 40-45% in the period 1993-2000. The standard deviation of this indicator fell from 25% in 1993 to around 15% in 2000, suggesting that the CEE countries have become more similar in this respect.
The literature on finance and economic development (see King and Levine, 1993a,b; Levine, 1997; Khan and Senhadji, 2000; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000) suggests that bank activities increases in income. This brief overview reveals that the transition economies differ substantially with respect to the development of the banking sector. The Czech Republic, Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia have the most developed banking systems, while Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania lag
behind. There appears to be a positive association between the level of financial and economic development for most countries in the year 2000.
As far as financial development is concerned, there is a great discrepancy between the transition countries and the euro area with respect to the level and composition of financial intermediation.
Foreign bank presence
The increasing foreign bank presence since the 1990s is one of the most striking developments in the banking system in the transition economies.
We find that, on average, foreign-owned banks account for more than half of the total number of banks in 2000 and hold more than two thirds of total bank assets in most transition economies. However, the importance of foreign banks varies a lot among countries. Still, foreign bank presence in all transition countries is considerably higher than in the European Union countries, with the exception of Luxembourg (Claessens et al., 2001; Noyer, 2001 ). After several banking crises hit most transition countries in the mid-1990s (see Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) for an overview of the different crises), bank privatization furthered foreign participation. Initially, most sales involved medium-sized banks. Later on, the larger state-owned saving banks were sold too. For example, in Estonia, the first foreign-owned bank was already established in 1992. But only in 1998 the share of foreign bank assets rose to 90%. During the same period, the number of foreign banks as share of the total number of banks in Estonia increased from 8% to 50%, reflecting that the two largest banks (Hansa Bank and Eesti Uhispank)
were sold to foreign banks in 1998 (EBRD, 2001).
Foreign bank characteristics
So far, our analysis has been based on aggregated data mainly provided by These problems differ in weight for the specific countries. To deal with these problems and making the BankScope database more reliable and useful, the background of every bank has been checked using the homepages of the banks or by having email contact with the bank.
BankScope provides balance sheet data and profit and loss accounts. We have added the following information: the year of establishment of the bank, whether the bank is foreign or not, the year the bank became foreign, whether it was a greenfield investment and, finally, the country of origin of 3 From Appendix 3, it appears that the aggregated data base and the extended BankScope data set are quite similar, although some small differences remain, in particular for the Czech and Slovak Republics. Part of the difference is due to differences in the definition of a bank. For the aggregated data base we use the definition of a bank of Beck et al. (1999) . Consequently, the aggregated data base does not contain saving banks, cooperative banks, mortgage banks and building societies. The classification 'commercial banks', which is used in BankScope, is not exactly the same.
the foreign owner. Furthermore, banks active on the market but not recorded in BankScope and foreign branches have been detected and added to the database, using the homepages of the specific banks.
With respect to the characteristics of the foreign banks in the CEE countries, we may summarize our findings as follows. The three largest banks in each European transition economy are, with a few exceptions, in foreign hands. Table 1 
Activities of domestic versus foreign banks
There are various motives for banks to go abroad and various determinants are involved in foreign banking (see Scholtens, 1992) . One of the main reasons for foreign expansion is that foreign banks follow their customers (Goldberg and Saunders, 1991; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Konopielko, 1999; We investigate what role foreign banks play in extending credit to the private and the public sector in comparison with domestic banks. Figure   6 shows the development of the average volume of credit to the private and public sector as share of total bank credit over the period 1993-2000 both by domestic and foreign banks. It is clear that domestic banks have been replaced by foreign banks as creditors. In 1993, domestic banks were the primary source of credit for the public and the private sector, while in 2000 foreign banks dominate both markets. Credit to the public sector exceeds credit to the private sector for domestic as well as for foreign banks. We find that the huge amount of credit to the public sector in the Czech Republic influences the two averages for the foreign banks to a great extent.
With the Czech Republic not taken into account, credit to the private sector by foreign banks would exceed credit to the public sector as from 1998.
Leaving out the Czech Republic hardly has any effect for the trend in credit supply by domestic banks; they still lend primarily to the public sector. As can be observed from Figure 7 , foreign banks in all transition countries, except for Slovenia, appear to be more involved with lending to the private sector than domestic banks. Still, there are substantial differences among the transition countries as to the relative importance of private lending by foreign banks. The most extreme case is Estonia, where domestic banks hardly provide credit to the private sector.
Performance
According to Claessens et al. (2001) , foreign banks are more profitable and efficient than domestic banks in developing countries, while in developed countries domestic banks are more profitable and efficient than foreign banks. These differences can reflect a differential impact of informational (dis)advantages, customer bases, bank procedures as well as different relevant regulatory and tax regimes. In contrast, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) and Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) find that foreign banks are less efficient than host nation banks in developed nations. Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2003) find that foreign affiliates of multinational firms use host nation banks for cash management services. This choice appears to affect the geographic scope and size of the chosen bank, the so-called bank reach. Furthermore, they find that legal and financial development of the host nation affect both bank nationality and bank reach. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) and Buch and DeLong (2001) analyze cross-border M&A in the banking industry. These, in general, appear to be relatively unprofitable (see also Berger et al., 2000; DeLong, 2001 ).
There are only few studies on the profitability and efficiency of the banking sector in the transition economies. Green et al. (2002) The ROA of foreign banks in Croatia sharply increased since its opening up to foreign banks. In Romania and Hungary, the foreign banks'
ROA fell in the period under consideration. Estonian domestic banks had a particular bad year in 1998 when their combined ROA was -24%. Without
Estonian banks, domestic banks' ROA in transition countries would have been -1.5% instead of -4.3%. Figure 8 shows that the ROA of domestic banks tends to converge to the average ROA level of foreign banks. The general conclusion can be that both for domestic and for foreign banks there is an upward trend in ROA, while domestic banks were more sensitive to the economic and financial crisis in 1998 (moratorium from the Russian debt crisis) than foreign banks. Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
The pattern for after tax income of domestic and foreign banks differs substantially from that of the aforementioned performance indicator.
Domestic and foreign banks are subject to contrasting developments in their after-tax income (see figure 9 ). As foreign banks initially experienced a decreasing after tax-income, after 1997 their after tax income followed an upward trend. Domestic banks however generate lower income every year since 1997. Both foreign and domestic banks generate a low after-tax income in Croatia and Estonia. In contrast, after tax income is relatively high in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic. Claessens et al. (2001) and Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) conclude that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks in transition economies. Our results broadly confirm these findings, but they also show that foreign banks need some time before they outperform domestic banks.
A stylized fact from the economic literature as referred to above is that the costs of foreign banks are lower than those of domestic banks.
However, for the transition countries, figure 11 reveals that the differences between domestic and foreign banks in the overhead costs as percentage of the total assets are rather small. In addition, one can observe the downward trend for both domestic and foreign banks. In the Czech Republic, the costs of domestic banks are even lower than the costs of most foreign banks in other countries. However, the foreign banks in the Czech Republic also have a lower cost level than the domestic ones. Estonia and Lithuania show a strong decrease in costs of domestic banks during the second part of the nineties. According to Lensink and Hermes (2002) , the costs of domestic banks in developing countries rise with foreign bank entry. We cannot confirm their conclusion for the transition economies. In sum, we find that foreign banks in the transition economies generally outperform domestic banks in terms of bank profitability.
However, we also find that most performance indicators converge in the late 1990s.
Concluding comments
Foreign bank entry has been one of the most striking features of the development of the banking system in the European transition economies.
At present, more than half the number of banks in the transition economies is foreign-owned and foreign-owned banks possess two thirds of total bank assets. This 'takeover' occurred within a period of less than ten years.
However, the speed of financial development has been rather slow in the transition countries, in particular the level of credit to the private sector. In the early years of transition, foreign banks established representative offices and took minority interests in domestic banks. It appears that geographical relatedness has been an important factor as far as the choice of the country of entry is concerned. From the mid-1990s onwards, foreign banks established greenfields and took minority interests in domestic banks. They gradually increased these interests and were active buyers of stakes in privatized banks. Ultimately, this has resulted in a substantial number of majority interests of foreign banks.
Whether the extensive involvement of foreign banks has been beneficial to European transition countries is hard to say. According to our analysis up to 2000, the general level of financial development, e.g. the level of total claims in the banking system as percentage of GDP, has increased only moderately. In addition, the composition of the financial structure did not change much: credit supplied to the private sector rose only moderately. Foreign banks contributed to this development only in that they took over the role as creditor. Although foreign banks lend more to the private sector than domestic banks, public credit of foreign banks exceeds private credit.
We also find that profitability of foreign banks is above that of 'Assets' refers to total domestic financial intermediation that the respective intermediary performs; see Beck et al. (1999) , p.4 (IMF definition).
Assets: see Beck et al. (1999) , Appendix, p. 4 (line 22 in IFS).
Foreign means: At least 50% of the shares of a bank is foreign owned.
Foreign participation: more than 5% and less than 50% foreign owned.
Net interest margin: see Beck et al. (1999) .
Overhead costs: see Beck et al. (1999) .
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